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Abstract: We consider future cash flows that are contingent both on dates in time and on 
uncertain states. The decision maker (DM) values the cash flows according to its
2 decision 
criterion: Here the payoffs’ expectation with respect to a capacity measure. The subjective 
measure grasps the DM’s behaviour in front of the future, in the spirit of de Finetti’s (1930) 
and of Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory in the case of risk. Decomposition of the criterion into two 
criteria that represent the DM’s preferences on uncertain payoffs and time contingent payoffs 
are derived from Ghirardato’s (1997) results. Conditional Choquet integrals are defined by 
dynamic  consistency  requirements  and  conditional  capacities  are  derived,  under  some 
conditions on information. In contrast with other models referring to dynamic consistency, 
ours doesn’t collapse into a linear one because it violates a weak version of consequentialism. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In order to decide on a public project, a private investment or any bet on future uncertain cash 
flows
3, a Decision Maker (DM) needs a present certainty equivalent, i.e. a present value, 
which can be compared to the costs. Such a present equivalent can be justified by a criterion 
representing the DM’s behaviour. Because most projects include flexibilities, it must be the 
case that the criterion takes them into acount, and hence that the present value integrates the 
future option values. An option will be exercised or not depending on information arrivals in 
                                                 
1 This paper borrows from several previous WP by the same authors. Comments, intuitions and criticisms from 
participants to several seminars (Paris, Milano, Torino) and conferences (RUD and FUR), and personally from 
Paolo Ghirardato and an anonymous referee, are greatly acknowledged. 
2 The decision maker is not necessarily a person in this paper, it could be any neutral entity, e.g. an 
administration. 
3 We assume consequences are expressed in monetary terms in this paper.   2 
the future. But information may modify the DM’s behaviour and hence its future payoffs 
valuation  conditional  on  information.  Consistence  of  the  present  value  and  of  the  future 
conditional values is central to the results in this paper (dynamic consistency).  
We assume the DM’s behaviour is represented by a non additive subjective expected utility 
(Choquet Expected Utility, Schmeidler (1989)). In the spirit of de Finetti’s (1930) subjective 
measure and of Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory in the case of risk, we concentrate on the special 
case where the utility is the identity (Chateauneuf (1991), but here we rely on the simpler 
Diecidue and Wakker (2002) model). In these  models the decision  criterion is the future 
payoffs present value, as well as their present certainty equivalent. Furthermore, the DM’s 
behaviour is completely grasped by the subjective measure: here a Choquet capacity. As a 
first consistency requirement we assume the DM assumes its future behaviours conditional on 
information arrivals will satisfy the same axioms as the present one (model consistency). The 
problem is then to condition Choquet integrals and capacities in a way that is consistent with 
the present value. 
Conditioning capacities is problematic: The pioneer’s work of Dempster (1967) and Shafer 
(1967) who presented the first formula (besides Bayes’) opened the way to many researches 
among  which  we  can  cite  (forgetting  many):  Fagin  and  Halpern  (1990)  who  introduced 
another rule (often called the Full Bayesian Updating Rule) axiomatised by Jaffray (1992), 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993) who compared the Bayesian and the Dempster-Shafer rule, etc. 
Denneberg (1994) deduced updating rules (the Full Bayesian Updating rule or the Bayesian 
rule, depending on the assumptions) from an implicit definition of the conditional Choquet 
integrals. He followed the usual (implicit) definition of the conditional Lebesgue integrals 
(Expectations)  in  classical  measure  theory  handbooks  from  which  Bayes’  rule  for 
probabilities is deduced. Let E
Y(X) be the expectation of a measurable function X conditional 
on information Y, Denneberg chose the definition : E[E
Y(X) – X] = 0 that is equivalent in the 
linear case to the more usual definition: E(X) = E[E
Y(X)]. Each of these formulas yields a 
different (implicit) definition of the conditional Choquet integral, and, depending on the case, 
different updating rules (see Kast, Lapied and Toqueboeuf (2007) for a complete presentation 
of these results). The previous defining equations impose a consistency between conditional 
integrals and non-conditional ones.  
Conversely, in the axiomatic approach we follow in this paper, the consistency condition (an 
axiom on the DM’s preferences) yields an equation that implicitly defines the conditional 
Choquet integral. The condition is usually called “Dynamic Consistency” (DC), e.g. in Karni 
and Schmeidler (1991). Another condition was dubbed “Consequentialism” (C) by Hammond   3 
(1989). We know that under the general formulations of the two axioms (DC) and (C), the 
preference representation criterion is linear (see Sarin and Wakker (1998), Machina (1998), 
Ghirardato (2002), Lapied and Toquebeuf (2007) and the relevant literature) and the measures 
degenerate into additive or quasi additive ones after several iterations. In this paper, we obtain 
a different result: non-additive updated capacities that do not collapse to additive ones. This is 
because we weaken Consequentialism in the following sense: As usual, counterfactual events 
are given a zero measure, but payoffs that would be obtained if these events realised still 
interfere with the valuation because they may modify the payoffs’ ranking
4. Furthermore, this 
paper departs from others where, even though it is invoked, dynamic consistency cannot play 
its full role because the models themselves are not really dynamical. Indeed, in most models, 
the set of future states and the information that may arrive “later” are left without reference to 
any real timing. In the practice of managing an investment or a project and calculating its ex-
ante value, the timing of decision making is crucial: Decisions will be taken at some future 
dates in accordance with the then available information, e.g. information may induce options 
to be exercised. Obviously, in a cash flow payoffs are contingent on future dates as well as on 
uncertain events. Both contingencies have to be taken into account by the decision criterion 
that bears on decision sequences conditional on future information arrivals, i.e. in the DM’s 
present valuation of the cash flow they generate. 
Time  is  indeed  relevant  for  dynamic  decision  making.  It  is  economically  measured  by 
discount factors: whether market ones when a market for riskless bonds exists, or individual 
ones  (preference  for  present  over  future  consumption).  Koopman  (1972)  gave  seminal 
conditions for this valuation to be additive (time separability). Then, Gilboa (1989) extended 
the model to the non-additive case. Notice that  Koopman and Gilboa, as well as all their 
followers (notably Chateauneuf and Rébillé (2004)) exclude uncertainty considerations. 
However, in general, future payoffs are also contingent on states (events) of uncertainty. Here 
again, axioms yielding additive properties to the representation of preferences were extended 
by Schmeidler (1989) among others to the non-additive case (e.g. Choquet Expected Utility).  
In order to take the two contingencies into account in this paper, we consider cash flows 
(contingent on future states in a set Ω) as being contingent on two factors: uncertain states and 
future dates. Formally, we write: Ω = S×T, where S stands for the set of uncertain States and T 
represent the set of dates in the future Time under consideration. Preferences of the decision 
maker could be defined on payoffs contingent on future states in Ω, but most of the time they 
                                                 
4 Ranking is fundamental to Choquet integrals, e.g. Rank Dependent Expected Utility.   4 
are better known on uncertain payoffs (real functions from S) and on date contingent payoffs 
(real functions from T). With linear value functions (functionals on real functions from S, T 
and Ω), present value is unambiguously the discounted expected payoffs
5. However if, as we 
assume,  the  decision  criteria  may  be  a  non-linear  value  function,  it  is  not  clear  how  to 
construct the present value of a cash flow X: Ω = S×T  R from the value of uncertain cash 
payoffs and the value of time contingent payoffs separately. Clarifying this point is the first 
step of this paper; the second steps yield dynamically consistent conditional measures on 
Uncertainty and on Time.  
 
In section 2 of the paper, we specify our model: representation of preferences, information, 
and the Ghirardato-Fubini theorem (Ghirardato 1997) on product spaces. We concentrate in 
section  3  on  the  conditioning  of  capacities  on  uncertain  states  and  in  section  4  on  the 
conditioning  of  capacities  on  dates  (discount  factors).  In  both  cases,  we  check  that 
consequentialism is violated and that capacities do not collapse into additive measures.  
 
2. The model 
 
We consider that a payoff is a measurable function X: Ω = S×T  R+ where S = {s1, … , sN} 
represents the set of uncertain states to whom the payoffs are contingent and T = {1, … , T} 
the set of future dates, both with the sets of parts, 2
S and 2
T, as algebras. Obviously, a project 
may have negative payoffs and uncertainty and time may not be perceived as finite sets, we 
restrict the problem to this simple case in order to concentrate on the principles of dynamic 
valuation, i.e. consistency of preferences with information arrivals. 
 
2.1. Representation of preferences  
 
Given we consider finite spaces, we can refer to a simple representation of preferences model, 
namely  the  generalisation  (for finite  sets)  of  de  Finetti’s (1930)  axioms  by  Diecidue  and 
Wakker (2002)
6. Notice that in these models (as well as in Yaari’s (1987) Dual Theory) the 
decision  criterion  is  an  expected  value  (Lebesgue  or  Choquet  integral)  with  respect  to  a 
subjective measure that represents the DM’s behaviour. The DM’s attitude toward the future 
                                                 
5 Or the discounted expected utility in more general models. Notice however that discounted expected utility is 
not necessary equal to expected utility of discounted payoffs, so that the same problem as the one we address 
here is posed. 
6 In a more general setting, we could refer to Chateauneuf’s (1991) model, for instance.   5 
payoffs is completely grasped by the measure, and its decision criterion is defined by a cash 
amount  (present  certain  value)  such  that  the  DM  is  indifferent  between  this  present  cash 
amount and the cash flow. 
Following Diecidue and Wakker (2002), we need the following definitions. 
 
Definition 2.1.1: Two measurable functions X and Y on a set of states E are comonotonic if 
and only if, for any two states e and e’: [X(e) – X(e’)][Y(e) – Y(e’)] ≥ 0. 
 
Definition 2.1.2: A comonotonic set of functions is such that all functions in this set are two 
by two comonotonic (notice that in R
m a comonotonic set is a positive cone generated by m 
linearly independent comonotonic characteristic functions). 
 
Definition  2.1.3:  A  Book  is  a  finite  sequence  of  preferences  between  two  measurable 
functions (bets’ or assets’ cash flows, for example): (Xi) , (Yi) , i=1…N, such that each Xi is 
weakly preferred to the corresponding Yi. 
 
Definition  2.1.4:  A  comonotonic  Book  is  formed  of  functions  belonging  to  the  same 
comonotonic set. 









A Dutch Book exhibits an incoherence between preferences and monotony. Now we can state 
the three basic axioms that yield the DM’s preference representation. 
 
Axiom1: Preferences define a complete pre-order on the set of measurable functions. 
Axiom 2: For any measurable function, there exists a constant number (constant equivalent) 
for which the DM is indifferent to the function. 
Axiom 3: Preferences allow no comonotonic Dutch Books. 
 
Theorem 2.1.1 (Diecidue and Wakker, 2002): 
For a preference relation on R
m satisfying axioms 1 and 2, for all X in R
m there exists a 
constant equivalent CE(X)∈ R such that the following three statements are equivalent: 
   6 
(i)  CE(.): R
m  R  is strictly monotonic, additive on comonotonic vectors (but non 
necessarily additive on non comonotonic vectors). 
(ii)  There exists a unique capacity such that CE(X) is the integral of X with respect to 
this measure.  
(iii)  CE(.) is such that axiom 3 is satisfied. 
 
Axiom 3 can be replaced by the stronger de Finetti’s (1931) coherence axiom: 
Axiom 3’: Preferences allow no Dutch Books. 
Then a special case of theorem 2.1 obtains with CE(.) additive and a probability as an additive 
(modular) capacity. 
The  proof  of  the  theorem  mainly  relies  on  Diecidue  and  Wakker’s  result:  the  No 
Comonotonic Dutch Books axiom implies strict monotonicity of the constant equivalent.   
 
The representation theorem yields the three value functions that we need in order to represent 
preferences over the future: Ω. With X: Ω = S×T  R+, the constant equivalent of X defined 
by the theorem is: 
CE(X) ≡ V(X) =   
X dΨ  whereΨ is a capacity, and we shall note:   
X dP if P is additive. 
V(X)  is a present certainty equivalent  of X. 
Obviously, Ψ defines two marginal capacities: ν (or µ if it is additive) on R
S and ρ (or π if it is 
additive) on R
T. From the previous representation theorem, we know that these measures 
represent the decision maker’s preferences over R
S and R
T that satisfy the same axioms as its 
preferences on R
Ω. The representations yield two constant equivalents. 
The certainty equivalent of uncertain payoff (E for expected) is: 
∀ζ:R
S R+,  E(ζ) =  S
 ζ(s)  dν(s)  if ν is a capacity,   E(ζ) =  S
 ζ(s)  dµ(s) if µ is additive. 
The present equivalent of date contingent payoffs (D(.) for discounted) is: 
∀ξ:R
T  R+, D(ξ) =   T
 ξ(t) dρ(t) if ρ is a capacity, D(ξ) =   T
 ξ(t) dπ(t) if π is additive. 
In most economic models these two representations are assumed to be known and the problem 
is to define a representation of preferences over R
S×T that is consistent with the previous ones. 
Two obvious candidates are: 
∀X: Ω = S×T  R+,   D[E(X)]  =    T
[   S
X(s,t)    dν(s)]  dρ(t)]  (Discounted  Expectation)
  and:   7 
      E[D(X)]  =  S
 [  T
 X(s,t)  dρ(t)] dν(s)  (Expected Discounting). 
In the special case where de Finetti’s coherence axiom (axiom 3’) is satisfied, the cash flows’ 
valuation  representing  the  DM’s  preferences  is  unambiguously  the  (subjective)  present 
certainty equivalent. Indeed, in this case we have: 
V(X) = D[E(X)] =   T
[  S
X(s,t)  dµ(s)]  dπ(t) =  S
 [  T
X(s,t)  dπ(t)] dµ(s) = E[D(X)].   
The  equalities  are  obtained  because  Fubini’s  theorem  applies  to  Lebesgue  integrals  with 
respect to additive measures. 
However, it is not the case that the two candidates yield the same result if the measures are 
not  additive  because  Fubini’s  theorem  doesn’t  apply.  This  why,  in  section  2.3,  we  shall 
invoke the Ghirardato-Fubini theorem that will allow us to construct V as whether DE or ED 
and investigate separately the effect of information arrivals on E and on D. 
 
Integrating informational values in the linear valuation of a cash flow is straightforward: If 
some information arrives at some date τ , it is valued at that date by the conditional valuation, 
say V
τ, and the original cash flow X = (X1, … XT) is indifferent to the cash flow  
(X1, … , Xτ-1, V
τ(X), 0, … , 0). Then, the later cash flow can be discounted under the usual 
conditions. 




Taking into account future flexibilities and options in an investment or a project, amounts to 
integrate the value of the options into the project’s present value. An option is exercised or not 
according to information arrivals of the type [Y=i], where i∈I, here a finite set of information 
values, and Y is a measurable function on Ω. Indeed, when information [Y=i] obtains, the DM 
may  anticipates  it  will  modify  its  preferences  over  the  project’s  payoffs  and  hence  its 
valuation.  For  instance,  its  aversion  to  uncertainty  (convex  capacity)  may  be  reduced  or 
increased depending on the type of information (“good” or “bad” news). Or its preferences for 
present consumption may change if it learns it has more wealth available. 
In the following we shall concentrate on the usual type of information, i.e. information at a 
given future date bearing on uncertain states. 
Let us consider a filtration on 2
S: F = {F0, … , FT} with F0 = {∅, S} ⊂ F1 ⊂ … ⊂ FT = 2
S.   8 
Information at date t = 1, … , T is given by an Ft-measurable function Yt on S that defines a 
partition It of Ft with elements [Yt=it]. In order to lighten notations, let M(t) = # I t and, for 
j = 1, … , M(t),  j
t i = {s∈S ; Yt(s) ∈  j




M (t)). We assume preferences and 
conditional preferences satisfy the following axiom proposed by Sarin and Wakker (1998): 
 
Axiom 4 (Model Consistency): Preferences on uncertain payoffs and preferences conditional 
on information satisfy the same axioms. (MC) 





t that are Choquet integrals with respect to capacities: Ψ
it, ν
it  and ρ
it ≡ ρ
t on Ω , S 
and T.  
 
The conditional Choquet integrals (and the corresponding conditional capacities) have to be 
defined,  at  least  implicitly,  from  the  unconditional  ones  by  some  (dynamic)  consistency 
requirements. Consistency between valuations before and after information arrivals can be 
questioned this way: If, for some it, V
it(X) ≥ V
it(X’) can we have: V(X) < V(X’) ? (We drop the 
time index in what follows.) 
The answer is yes, there are cases where we could have V(X) ≥ V(X’). For instance, assume 
the set [Y=i] excludes the set on which X < X’, so that X ≥ X’ on any set in σ([Y=i] the σ–
algebra generated by Y
-1. Then, if preferences are monotonic we could have a contradiction 
between unconditional and conditional valuations
7. However we need not have one because 
all the i’s are possible and the decision maker may still take into account payoffs for which 
X < X’ and then not prefer X to X’. However if, for all i’s, we had X = X’ on [Y=i]
c, then, 
consistency with information arrivals would imply that:  
∀it∈I, V
it (X) ≥ V
it(X’) ⇔ V(X) ≥  V(X’). 
This equivalence (under the condition: X = X’ on [Y=i]
c) is the way Karni and Schmeidler 
(1991)
8, for instance, expressed Dynamic Consistency (they did it in terms of preferences 
instead of values as we did and they limited information to a unique value).  
We’ll require a similar but weaker condition, as expressed for example by Nishimura and 
Osaki (2003):  
 
                                                 
7 For instance, it would be the case if the decision maker’s preferences satisfied consequentialism. 
8 But see also : Sarin and Wakker (1998), Machina (1998) and Ghirardato (2002).   9 
Axiom 5 (Dynamic Consistency): 
∀ τ = 1, … , T–1, ∀ X, X' such that: ∀ t = 0, … , τ–1, ∀ s ∈ S, Xt(s) = X't(s), 
  
  





Or, in terms of values: [∀iτ, ∈ Iτ  V
iτ (X) ≥ V
iτ(X’)] ⇒ V(X) ≥  V(X’).  (DC)     
 
In order to address the problem of consistently conditioning V, D and E when V = DE or 
V = ED, we need the following extension of Fubini’s theorem. 
 
2.3 Ghirardato-Fubini theorem 
 
Let us recall that the DM has preferences on R
Ω that are represented by a Choquet integral 
with respect to a capacity Ψ on 2
Ω:   X R
Ω, V(X) =     X  dΨ . 
As Ω = S T, Ψ yields two marginal capacity measures, say: ν on 2
S and ρ on 2
T. In turn, 
these  two  capacity  measures  represent  the  DM’s  behaviour  in  front  of  uncertain  states-
contingent payoffs and of future dates contingent payoffs. These preferences over R
S and R
T 
satisfy the same axioms than preferences on R
Ω, so they are represented again by Choquet 
integrals that define:  
  -  X R
Ω,  t T, Xt   t E(Xt) =  S
Xt dν . 
  - X R
Ω,  s S, Xs   s D(Xs) =   T
Xs dρ . 
Mixing up the marginal measures and the value function representing preferences on R
S and 
R
T and introducing a hierarchy between the two components (that has to be justified), we can 
define: 
  - X R
R×T   ED(X) = E[D(X)] =  S
[  T
 X(s,t) dρ(t)] dν(s). 
  - X R
R×T   DE(X) = D[E(X)] =   T
[ S
 X(s,t) dν(s)] dρ (t) . 
 
These value functions define two orders of preferences that have the same properties as the 
previous ones and can be represented by: ED(X) =    X  dΨ1   and DE(X) =     X  dΨ2 . In 
general,  Ψ1,  Ψ2   and  Ψ   will  not  coincide  except  in  some  particular  cases  that  we  shall 
consider.   10 
As we shall see, the hierarchy between preferences on time and on uncertain states can be 
justified by some hedging properties. When this is the case, it will be possible to show the 
coherence of the different preferences on Ω (and of the measures they define). 
 
Now let us recall some definitions introduced by Ghirardato (1997): 
 
Definition 2.3.1 (Slice comonotonicity):  
- X R
S T is T-slice (resp. S-slice) comonotonic, if for all t in T, its t-sections on R
S (resp.  for 
all s in S, its s-sections on R
T) are comonotonic. 
- X R
S T is slice comonotonic, if all its t-sections and its s-sections are comonotonic. 
- A set F ⊂ R
S×T= R
Ω is said to be  comonotonic if all the s-sections of its characteristic 
function 1F are comonotonic, which is equivalent to: all its t-sections are comonotonic, and 
then to: 1F is slice comonotonic.  
 
The relevance of this definition for the problem of valuing an investment is related to the 
notion of hedging future variations, and hence to preferences showing more or less variation 
aversion. T-slice comonotonicity excludes the possibility that uncertain variations are hedged 
as  time  passes.  The  following  example  shows  a  T-slice  comonotonic  insurance  contracts 
portfolio X : losses at time 1 are not smoothed by losses at time 2 (other examples are in 
sections 3 and 4).  
Let S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} (vertical) and T = {0, 1, 2} (horizontal, the date 0 is the present, the cash 
amount can be interpreted as the initial available capital or the investment): 
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In contrast, the payoffs of project X’ at time 1 show a variation that is compensated by the 
variations at time 2; X’1 and X’2 can hedge each other because they are not comonotonic:  
 
 
               
 
           
           
           
 
             
   
 
Similarly, the DM can’t expect that variations from one date to the other can be hedged by 
different uncertain trajectories in an S-comonotonic cash flow: X is comonotonic but X’ is not 
S-slice comonotonic because X’(s2) = (-20, 10, -1) is not comonotonic with X’(s3) = ( -20, -
9, 8). Hence, these two cases (and the case where both sections are comonotonic) are relevant 
for particular investment problems where the DM is more concerned by date variations than 
by uncertain variations or the converse.  
Mathematically,  the  impact  of  comonotonicity  on  linearity  is  easily  understood  with  the 
following: 
 
Lemma  2.3.1:  For  any  T-slice  comonotonic  X  such  that  ∀t∈T,  Xt∈Ck  where  Ck  is  a 
comonotonic class, k∈{1, … , N!}, then capacity ν is represented by a probability measure µk 
and  ∀t∈T, E(Xt) =  S
Xt dν =  S
Xt dµk. 
For any S-slice comonotonic X such that ∀s∈S, Xs∈Ch where Ch is a comonotonic class, 
 h∈{1, … , T!}, then ρ is represented by a probability measure πh and 
 ∀s∈S, D(Xs) =   T
Xs dρ =   T
 Xs dρh. 
 
Proof: If X is T-slice comonotonic,  t T, X(.,t) belongs to some comonotonic class, say Ck, 
k=1, … ,N! of R
S. A comonotonic class Ck is generated by linearly independent comonotonic 






4   12 
characteristic functions of sets: Ak
1⊂ A k
2⊂ … ⊂ A k
N = R
S. Then, because we assumed all 















Furthermore, we know that a capacity ν on 2
S  is additive on each comonotonic class so that: 
 Ck, k=1, … ,N!  ∃µk additive, Xt∈Ck, E(Xt) = S







k ) =  S
 Xt dµk. 
Similarly, if X is S-slice comonotonic, we have: 
 Ch, h =1, … ,T! ∃πh additive, Xs∈Ch, D(Xs) =   T







h) =   T
 Xs dπh. 
QED 
  
In order to use some of Ghirardato’s (1997) results, we need to introduce a new axiom on 
preferences  that  insure  that  preferences  on  R
Ω,  R
S  and  R
T  are  consistent.  Consistency  of 
marginal preferences on state or on date contingent payoffs, and global preferences on cash 
flows can be expressed by: The measures ν, ρ and Ψ are such that Ψ can be reconstructed 
from  ν  and  ρ.  Obviously,  this  is  requiring  too  much  in  general  because  there  are  some 
intertwinements between state and date contingencies that may induce some preferences to be 
modified  when  future  payoffs  are  perceived  as  a  whole.  However,  when  no  hedging 
possibilities are available, whether on uncertain payoffs or on certain cash flows, we can 
require some consistency from the DM’s behaviour (notice that the hedging argument is the 
one used to justify comonotonic additivity, or comonotonic independence, or No comonotonic 
Dutch books). The axiom could be expressed as: Given a set of comonotonic assets on R
S×T, if 
there are no Dutch Books with their S-sections and no Dutch Books with their T-sections, 
then there should be no Dutch Books formed with these assets. More precisely in terms of our 
preference representations: 
 
Axiom 6 (Comonotonic Consistency): 
If F is a comonotonic subset of Ω = S×T and ∀t ∈ T Ft = {s∈S / 1F(s, t)= 1},  
∀s ∈ S Fs = {t∈T / 1F(s, t) = 1}, then: 
[ ∀t ∈ T E(1F(., t)) = ν(Ft) and ∀s ∈ S D(1F(s, .)= ρ(Fs ) ]  ⇒  V(1F) =  Ψ(F). 
   13 
Obviously, the axiom is always satisfied by definition of the marginal measures if F = A×A’, 
A ⊂ S, A’ ⊂ T. Assume the axiom is not satisfied by some DM for some comonotonic F that is 
not a rectangle: For example assume that for some trajectory s, the DM had a measure ρ’ on 
Time, ρ≠ρ’ with ρ’ convex while ρ is not. This would mean that the DM is more time-
variations averse when confronted to the certain date contingent cash flow trajectory s than it 
would be if the payoffs were part of a state and date contingent flow. Obviously, that could be 
acceptable if F were not comonotonic, but, because it is comonotonic, F offers no possibilities 
for  hedging  time-variations  whatever  the  trajectory,  hence  the  two  different  measures  are 
inconsistent. 
Axiom 6 yields a result that was imposed as a mathematical condition in Ghirardato (1997) 
who dubbed it “the Fubini property”. 
 
Proposition 2.3.1: Under axiom 6, “the Fubini property” is satisfied:  
∀F ∈ 2 
S×T, Ψ(F) = D(ν[{s∈S / (s,t)∈F]) = E(ρ[{t∈T / (s,t)∈F]), or: 
   T S
1F(s,t) dψ(s,t) =   T
dρ(t)  S
1F(s,t) dν(s) = S
 dν(s)  T
1F(s,t) dρ(t). 
 
Proof: Notice that  S
1F(s,.) dν(s) is comonotonic with any of the 1F(.,t), t∈T, then there 
exists an additive probability πh on T such that: 
   T
[ S
1F(s,t) dν(s)]dρ(t) =   T
[ S
1F(s,t) dν(s)]dπh(t)  and 
∀s∈S   T
1F(s,t) dρ(t) =   T
1F(s,t) dπh(t). 
But    T
1F(.,t)  dπh(t)    is  comonotonic  with  any  of the  1F(s,.),  s∈S,  hence  there  exists  an 
additive probability µk on S such that : 
 S
[  T
1F(s,t) dπh(t)]dν(s) =  S
[  T
1F(s,t) dπh(t)]dµk(s). 
Fubini’s theorem applies and   S
[  T
1F(s,t) dπh(t)]dµk(s) =   T
[ S
1F(s,t) dµk(s)]dπh(t). 
This yields the second equality of the lemma.  
The first equality obtains because µk and πh define a product probability, say Φj on S×T, but 
Φj is an additive representation of Ψ valid on the comonotonic class Cj,  j=1, …, (N×T)! (in 
R
Ω) to which 1F belongs. As this is true for any comonotonic class, the Φj’s define Ψ.   
QED 
   14 
Now,  Ghirardato’s  theorem  (his  lemma  3  in  our  simple  model)  yields  the  following 
decomposition of preferences on R
S×T and preferences on R
S and on R
T: 
 
Proposition 2.3.2 (Ghirardato): Under the comonotonic consistency axiom, if preferences 
on  R
S×T  satisfy  axioms  1  to  3  and  are  represented  by  V  (defined  by  capacity  Ψ)  and 
preferences on R
S by E (capacity ν) and on R
T by D (capacity ρ), we have: 
1- If X in R
S×T is T-slice comonotonic, then: V(X) = E[D(X)].  
Furthermore, for any comonotonic class Ck in R
S containing all the comonotonic t-sections of 
X,  there  exists  a  probability  distribution  µk  defining  an  additive  representation  Ek  of 
preferences on Ck such that for any X’ with all its comonotonic t-sections in Ck:   
V(X’) = Ek[D(X’)]. 
2- If X in R
S×T is S-slice comonotonic, then: V(X) = D[E(X)].  
Furthermore, for any comonotonic class Ch containing all the comonotonic s-sections of X, 
there exists a probability distribution πh defining an additive representation Dh of preferences 
on Ch such that for any X’ with all its comonotonic s-sections in Ch:   
V(X’) = Dh[E(X’)]. 
3- If X in R
S×T is slice comonotonic, then: V(X) = E[D(X)] = D[E(X)]. 
 
Interpretations:  The  first  two  results  are  lemma  3  of  Ghirardato  (1997).  The  additive 
representation (valid on one comonotonic class only) is interpreted this way:  
For the first one, consider a model consistent with Gilboa’s (1989) idea in which time is 
measured by an non decreasing, non negative and bounded measure (a capacity in our special 
case). In this model, uncertainty has not been taken into account. Now, if we add it at each 
date, we obtain our model. However, because all the uncertain variables are comonotonic, 
comonotonic additivity applies and we only need to know the probability distribution that 
represents it on each comonotonic class. This can, but need be to be, extended to the whole 
space of uncertain variables, assuming then that de Finetti’s coherence axiom applies.  
The second formula is the usual discounted expected payoffs (here in the sense of a Choquet 
integral).  Notice  that  discount  factors  (mathematically  probabilities,  here)  depend  on  the 
comonotonic class in which there are no possibilities for hedging time variations.  
The last result is the famous Ghirardato-Fubini theorem applied to our model. In all three 
cases, we obtain a representation of preferences in terms of some present value (constant 
equivalent), with the first integral additive.   15 
 
In the next two sections, we shall use the Ghiraradato-Fubini theorem to address the problem 
of conditioning the present value expressed in terms of a Choquet integral and derive some 
results about conditional capacities. 
 
3. Conditional valuation of S-slice comonotonic cash payoffs 
 
In this section, we consider S-slice comonotonic cash payoffs X: S × T  R+, i.e. payoffs such 
that their time variations along trajectories all go the same way and hence can't be hedged.  
From  Ghirardato’s  theorem  (proposition  2.3.2,  part  2)  preferences  of  the  DM  satisfying 
axioms 1 to 3 and 6 are represented for all cash payoffs in a comonotonic class Ch in R
T, by 
V = DhE where Dh is linear, expressing the fact that for the cash payoffs at stake the DM 
decides as if it were time variation neutral. From now on we’ll drop the h index.  In the 
following, E
it and ν




t  will be defined, implicitly, by axioms 4 
and 5.  
 
We assume X is a F–measurable process and we add a “present” for notational convenience as 
a date 0 that has no other role than defining an eventually non zero initial cash amount. Then, 













     
 with, ∀ t ∈ T, ∀ s ∈ S, Xt(s) ≥ 0, (s1) =…= X0(sN) = x0∈ R+. 
Let’s introduce the usual notation for a Choquet integral: ∀ t ∈ T, 
  
Et(X) = Xt(s)  (s)
s S
   
where,  if  for  instance  X(s1) ≤…≤ X(sN),  Δν(sn) = ν({sn,…, sN}) – ν({sn+1,  …,  sN})  with 
{sN+1} = ∅ for notational convenience. Then, we have: 
  




  = Et(X) (t)
t T














     
 ∈ R
T, and π(0) = 1, we have: V[EC(X)] = V(X). 
Therefore, EC(X) is a certainty equivalent process of X. 
From Model Consistency (axiom 4) we have the same type of value functions for a given 
information iτ  at some date τ.   16 
∀ τ ∈ T, ∀ iτ ∈ Iτ, 
  
Vi  (X) = [ Xt(s)  i  (s)]
s S
     (t)
t T
  = Et
i  (X)   (t)
t T
  , 
where: ∀ t = 0,…,τ – 1, π
τ(t) = 0, π
τ(τ) = 1,  ∀ t = τ,…,T, 
  
Et
i  (X) = Xt(s)  i  (s)
s S
  . 
If we write: 
  
ECi  (X) =
E 
















, we have: 
  
Vi  [ECi  (X)]=Vi  (X). 
 
3.1. Dynamic consistency 
 
In section 2, we introduced a weak definition of Dynamic Consistency (Axiom 5) that yields a 
link between unconditional and conditional valuations. We weaken it again thanks to: 
 
Proposition 3.1.1:  Axiom 5 (DC) implies: 
 ∀ τ = 1,…,T–1, ∀ t = τ,…,T,
  
[ Xt(s)  i  (s)]
s S
 
i   I 
    (i  ) = Xt(s)  (s)
s S
    (3.1) 
 
Proof: ∀ τ = 1,…,T–1, define Z
τ as follows: ∀ t = 0,…,τ–1, ∀ s ∈ S, Xt(s) = Z
τ
t(s). Then: 
∀ t = τ,…,T, ∀ s ∈ S, ∃ l ∈ {1, … , M(τ)}, such that 
  








∀ iτ ∈ Iτ, 
  
Vi  (Z  ) = [ Et





  . 
Suppose w.l.o.g. that, for an information at date τ: 
  
i  = i 





(X)  …  Et
i 
m(  )






i(X)  i  (i)
i I 






1  … i 
l )  i 
m(  )
(i 
1  … i 
l 1)]
l=1
M (  )








1  … i 
l )  i 
m(  )
(i 
1  … i 
l 1)]
l=1
m(  ) 1








1  … i 
m(  ))  i 
m(  )
(i 
1  … i 








1  … i 
l )  i 
m(  )
(i 
1  … i 
l 1)]
l=m(  )+1
M (  )
  .   17 
With  the  following  normalisation  of  conditional  capacities:  i ⊂ A ⇒ ν
i(A) = 1, 
i ∩ A = ∅ ⇒ ν
i(A) = 0, we have:
  
Et
i(X)  i  (i)
i I 




i  (X). 
It follows that: 
∀ iτ ∈ Iτ, 
  
Vi  (Z  ) = Et
i  (X)   (t)
t= 
T
  =Vi  (X). 
Therefore, under axiom 5 (DC), we have: 
  
V(Z  ) =V(X), which implies: 
  





   (t)+ [ Et
i  (X)  (i  )]












i  (X)  (i  )]




   (t) = [ Xt(s)  (s)]
s S
   (t)
t= 
T
  . 
This equality is satisfied for any X, and then it must be true at each date t: 
  
Et
i  (X)  (i  )
i   I 
  = [ Xt(s)  i  (s)]
s S
 
i   I 
    (i  ) = Xt(s)  (s)
s S
      (3.1) QED 
 
We shall refer to (3.1) in the following as the dynamic consistency linking unconditional and 
conditional valuations. 
 
3.2 Updating capacities 
 
Relation (3.1) is a condition on the DM’s preferences representation that yields an implicit 
definition of conditional Choquet expectation. We apply it to characteristic functions in order 




9: Under relation (3.1), for any i ∈ I τ, the conditional capacity of a set 
A ∈ Ft, t > τ, is given by: 





 (Bayes updating rule). 
(ii)  If A
C ⊂ i, 
  
 i(A) =
 (A iC)  (iC)
1  (iC)
 (Dempster-Schafer updating rule). 
 
                                                 
9 Notice that the same results were obtained by Chateauneuf et al. (2001) with another preference representation 
model in the case of uncertain payoffs in a static setting and under different assumptions.   18 
Proof:  Relation  (3.1):
  




    (i) = Xt(s)  (s)
s S
    can  be  applied  to 
characteristic functions. For A ∈ Ft, let Xt = 1A, then: 
  
 (A) =  i(A)  (i)
i=i1
iM(  )
    (3.2). 
The conditional capacity ν
i(A) can be calculated in two cases only: 
(i)  When  A ⊂ i,  the  "comonotonic"  case  (because  1A  and  1i  are  comonotonic  uncertain 
variables).  
In this case, ν
i(A) ≥ 0 and ν










, which is Bayes formula. 
(ii) When A
C ⊂ i, the "antimonotonic" case (because 1A and 1i are anticomonotonic, i.e. 1A and 
–1i are comonotonic uncertain variables).  
In this case, ν
i(A) ≤ 1 and ν
j(A) = 1, for j ∈ Iτ, j ≠ i. Relation (3.2) implies: 
ν(A) = ν
i(A) + [1 – ν
i(A)] ν(i
C), and then 
  
 i(A) =
 (A)  (iC)
1  (iC)
=
 (A iC)  (iC)
1  (iC)
, which is 
the Dempster-Shafer formula. 
QED 
 
The two rules we obtain result from the ranking of values after information obtains, and it 
depends on the type of information (comonotonic or antimonotonic with payoffs). The type of 
information  can  be  interpreted  as  a  “good”  or  “bad”  news  (with  respect  to  what  was 
expected). The fact that these rules integrate values that couldn’t not obtain after information 




Another  familiar  consistency  condition  known  as  consequentialism  (Hammond (1989))  is 
usually imposed as an axiom on preferences. It is well known however (see, for instance Sarin 
and Wakker (1998), Machina (1998), Karni and Schmeidler (1991), Ghirardato (2002) and 
Lapied  and  Toquebeuf  (2007))  that  Model  consistency,  Dynamic  consistency  and 
Consequentialism imply additive (or quasi always additive) models. Ours is not, under the 
two first assumptions, hence it must be that Consequentialism is not satisfied, as we show 
below.    19 
 
Definition 3.3.1 (Consequentialism in a dynamic setting): 
∀ τ = 0,…,T, 
  
 i    I  , [∀ t = τ ,…,T, ∀ s ∈ iτ, Xt(s) = X’t (s)] 
  
  X  i  X'   (C). 
 
Proposition 3.3.1: Preferences satisfying axioms 1 to 6 on the subset of S-slice comonotonic 
cash payoffs do not satisfy (C). 
 
Proof: Let us consider S = {s1,s2,s3,s4}, I1 = {i
1,i
2}, i
1 = {s1,s2}, i
2 = {s3,s4}, T = {0,1,2} and 
two cash flows X, X', with the following payoffs: 
X0 = X’0 = 12, 
X1({s1}) = X1({s2}) = X’1({s1}) = X’1({s2}) = 10, 
X1({s3}) = X1({s4}) = X’1({s3}) = X’1({s4}) = 9, 
X2({s1}) = 8, X2({s2}) = 4, X’2({s1}) = 0.2, X’2({s2}) = 0.4, 
X2({s3}) = X’2({s3}) = 2, X2({s4}) = X’2({s4}) = 1. 
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Because X and X’ are S-slice comonotonic cash flows, we can apply DE valuation. 











(X) = 9+  1(2){1 [1  i2





(X') = 9+  1(2){1 [1  i2
({s3})]+ 2  i2
({s3})}. 
From Proposition 3.2.1: 
- Because {s3} ⊂ i







- Because  {s1,s2,s3}
C = {s4} ⊂ i









1(2) = 0.9, and ν be a convex (non-additive) capacity with: 
ν({s3}) = 0.3, ν(i
1) = 0.5, ν(i
2) = 0.4, ν({s1,s2,s3}) = 0.9. 






(X') =10.575,  which  is  in  contradiction  with 
Consequentialism.   
QED 
 
Proposition 3.3.2: V = DE does not collapse into discounted expected cash flows. 
 




(X) =10+  1(2){4  [1  i1





(X') =10+  1(2){0.2 [1  i1
({s2,s3,s4})]+ 0.4   i1
({s2,s3,s4})}. 
From Proposition 3.2.1: 
9 
1   21 
- Because {s1} ⊂ i







- Because  {s2,s3,s4}
C = {s1} ⊂ i





 ({s2,s3,s4})  (i2)
1  (i2)
. 























  =1.75. 
Relation (3.1) is trivially satisfied for τ = t = 1, we only have to consider the case where τ = 1 
and t = 2: 
  




    (i) = 4.1= X2(s)  (s)
s S
  , 
  




    (i) = 0.86 = X'2(s)  (s)
s S
  . 
Therefore,  relation  (3.1)  is  consistent  with  the  (non-additive)  capacity  ν  and  with  the 
conditional capacities defined by proposition 3.2.1. QED 
 
The counter example used to prove the proposition uses the two the alternative two updating 
rules, other models based on dynamic consistency rely on one rule only.  
 
4. Conditional valuation of T-slice comonotonic cash payoffs 
 
In  this  section  we  concentrate  on  cash  payoffs  with  all  their  t-sections  in  the  same 
comonotonic  class  in  R
S,  say  Ck,  hence  their  uncertain  variations  can't  be  hedged.  As  a 
consequence  of  Ghirardato’s  theorem  (proposition  2.3.2,  part  1),  preferences  on  R
S×T  are 
represented by the valuation function V = EkD, where Ek is a Lebesgue integral with respect to 
a probability distribution µk on 2
S  and D a Choquet integral with respect to capacity ρ.  In the 
following, we drop the index k. 
Because information only bears on 2
S, its influence on preferences over R
T is only related to 
the date at which it obtains. Otherwise stated: D
i
t ≡ D
t is a Choquet integral with respect to a   22 
capacity ρ
t
 that is contingent on date t only, while E
i
t is the usual conditional expectation and 
µ 
i
t is obtained by the probabilistic Bayes’rule. 
 
With the notation we introduced in section 2 for Choquet integrals (here on R
T) the valuation 
formula becomes: 
  




  = Ds(X)µ(s)
s S
  , where: ∀ s ∈ S, 
  
Ds(X) = Xt(s)  (t)
t T
  . 
Let us define: 
  
ET(X) =
Ds1(X) 0 … 0
… … …












S, with ρ(0) = 1. 
Then: V[ET(X)] = V(X) and ET(X) is an uncertain present equivalent of X. 
Under Model Consistency, axiom 4, we have the same type of value functions conditional to a 
given information: 
∀ τ ∈ T, ∀ iτ ∈ Iτ, 
  




  µi  (s) = Ds
  (X)µi  (s)
s S
  , where:  
∀ s ∈ iτ, 
  
Ds
  (X) = Xt(s)    (t)
t T
  . 
Let us note: 
  
ET  (X) =
Ds1
  (X) 0 … 0
… … …
DsN













τ(τ) = 1, we have: 
  
Vi  [ET  (X)]=Vi  (X). 
 





+ =  {τ,…,T}. 
 
4.1 Dynamic consistency 
 
As  in  the  previous  section,  Dynamic  Consistency  (Axiom  5)  yields  a  link  between 
unconditional and conditional valuations. 
 
Proposition 4.1.1:  Axiom 5 (DC) implies :   23 
∀ τ = 1,…,T–1, ∀ s ∈ S,
  
Xt
  (s)  (t)
t   
  = Xt(s)  (t)
t T
    (4.1) 
where: τ
— = {0,…,τ}, 
  
Xt
  (s) = Xt(s), if  t       { },  Xt
  (s) = Ds
  (X), if  t =  , and ∀ s ∈ S, 
  
Ds
  (X) = Xt(s)    (t)
t T
  . 
 
Proof: ∀ τ = 1,…,T–1, define: 
  
Z  =
X0 … X  1(s1) Ds1
  (X) 0 … 0
… … … …
X0 … X  1(sN) DsN
















For any s ∈ S, consider a permutation of the dates t = 0,…,τ – 1 such that 
  
0   X(0)(s)  …  X(k)(s)   Ds




     (t) =
t T
  X(t)(s){  [(t),…,(   1), ]    [(t +1),…,(   1), ]}
(t)=(0)
(k)
   
  
+Ds
  (X){  [(k +1),…,(   1), ]    [(k +1),…,(   1)]} 
  
+ X(t)(s){  [(t),…,(   1)]    [(t +1),…,(   1)]}
(t)=(k+1)
(  1)
   
  
= Ds
  (X)   ( ) = Ds
  (X). 
∀ iτ ∈ Iτ, 
  
Vi  (Z  ) = [ Zt
     (t)
t T
  ]µi  (s)
s S
  = Ds
  (X)µi  (s)
s S
  =Vi  (X). 
Therefore, under axiom 5 (DC), we have: 
  




t   
    (t)]µ(s)
s S
  = [ Xt(s)
t T
    (t)]µ(s)
s S




  (s) = Xt(s), if  t       { },  Xt
  (s) = Ds
  (X), if  t =   . 
This equality is satisfied for any X, and then it should be true for each state s: 
∀ τ = 1,…,T–1, ∀ s ∈ S,
  
Xt
  (s)  (t)
t   
  = Xt(s)  (t)
t T
    (4.1) 
QED 
 
4.2 "Upstating" capacities on Time   24 
 
If updating means that we modify the measure of uncertainty according to information at 
some date, then we dubb "upstating" the fact that we modify the measure of time according to 
information (on the set of states) at the date at which it is obtained. Given that the DM’s 
preferences satisfy axiom 5 (Dynamic Consistency) and hence relation (4.1) we have: 
 
Proposition 4.2.1: Under relation (4.1), for F ⊂ T, with τ
— = {0,…,τ}, and τ
+ = {τ,…,T}, 
the “upstated” discount factors are given by: 
(i)  If 
  
 (F)    [(F   –) { }]: 
  
   (F   +) =
 (F) –  [(F   –) { }]+  ({ })
 ({ })
. 
(ii)  If 
  
 (F)    [(F   –) { }]: 
     
  
   (F   +) =
 (F) –  (F   –)






We drop the reference to state s in relation (4.1) w.l.o.g:
  
Xt
   (t)
t   
  = Xt  (t)
t T
   (4.2)  




  =  (F), and 
  
D  (X) = Xt    (t)
t  +
  =    (F   +). 
We have to consider two cases: 
(i) 
  




t   
  =  [(F   –) { }]+  ({ })[   (F   +) –1]=  (F), 
(ii)  
  




t   
  =  [(F   –) { }]   (F   +)+  (F   –)[1–    (F   +)]=  (F). 
These relations yield the “upstating” formulas under the equivalent conditions given in the 
proposition.  
QED   25 
 
In the more familiar case where F = {0,…,T} we have the following: 
 
Corollary 4.2.1: Under relation (4.1), for F = {0,…,T}, the “upstated” discount factors are 
given by: 
  
   ({ ,…,T}) =




As in the previous section, the different formulas come from the ranking of payoffs, but this 
time it’s the payoffs before information obtains that make the difference. 
The interpretations of these “upstating” formula are not straightforward. We can however 
propose  the  following:  Given  we  deal  with  T-slice  comonotonic  payoffs,  the  important 
variations for the DM are the ones due to time. Hence, the timing of decisions is the most 
relevant feature for the valuation problem (and not the subsets of states that may be obtained 
after information). The weights given to the payoffs after information is obtained depend on 
the  weights  given  in  the  past  because  these  enter  into  the  payoffs’  ranking.  As  a  result, 
aversion to time variations, say, may be modified depending on the relative importance of 
future vs past payoffs. The important point to note, is that the value of the past does count. 
This is in contrast with the additive case where the usual compound discount factors formula 
would yield: 
  
   ({ ,…,T}) =
 ({ ,…,T})
 ({ })
. We shall come back to this in section 4.3 where 
we’ll see that this is what violates consequentialism in our model. Here, in contrast with the 
case of conditioning uncertainty, comonotonicity only plays a role in the ranking of values 






With the definition of Consequentialism (C) given in section 3, we have: 
 
Proposition 4.3.1: Preferences satisfying axioms 1 to 6 on the subset of S-slice comonotonic 
cash payoffs do not satisfy (C). 
   26 
Proof: Let us consider the following certain payoffs X and X': 
X0 = 1, X1 = 0, X2 = 0, X3 = 1, X4 = 1,  X'0 = 0, X'1 = 1, X'2 = 0, X'3 = 1, X'4 = 1, 
or:  X = 1F, F = {0,3,4},      X’ = 1H, H = {1,3,4}. 
 
t  0  1  2  3  4 
X :  1  0  0  1  1 
X’ :  0  1  0  1  1 
 
Let ρ be a capacity such that: ρ(F) =  ρ(0,3,4) > ρ(0,2) = ρ[(F ∩ τ
–) ∪ {τ}], and 
        ρ(H) =  ρ(1,3,4) < ρ(1,2) = ρ[(F ∩ τ
–) ∪ {τ}]. 
From Proposition 4.2.1, 
  
 2(F   +) =  2(3,4) =
 (0,3,4)   (0,2)+  (2)
 (2)
>1  case (i) 
  
 2(H  +) =  2(3,4) =
 (1,3,4)   (1)
 (1,2)   (1)
<1      case (ii) 
For these payoffs, Consequentialism implies that 
  
V2(X) =V2(X'). We have: 
  
V2(X) = Xt  2(t)
t=0
4
  = D2(X) =  2(F) 
 
  
=  2(F   +) =  2(3,4) =




V2(X') = X't   2(t)
t=0
4
  = D2(X') =  2(H) 
 
  
=  2(H  +) =  2(3,4) =
 (1,3,4)   (1)




V2(X) >V2(X'), which is in contradiction with consequentialism.   
QED 
 
Proposition 4.3.2: V = ED does not collapse to expected additively discounted cash flows. 
 






  =1 [ (0,2)   (2)]+ D2(X)   (2) =  (0,3,4) = Xt  (t)
t=0
4






  = D2(X') [ (1,2)   (1)]+1   (1) =  (1,3,4) = X't   (t)
t=0
4
  .   27 
Hence relation (4.1) is satisfied for τ = 2.  
The same result holds for τ = 1 and τ = 3. 
Relation (4.1) is then consistent with a (non-additive) capacity ρ and with the conditional 





In our explicitly dynamic model, consistency of ex-ante and ex-post valuations plays a central 
role in the definition of conditional Choquet integrals and then of conditional capacities. We 
can derive updating and “upstating” capacities in the case where information is comonotonic 
(or antimonotonic) with payoffs. The role of comonotonicity is crucial in our model, it has an 
interpretation in terms of information: information comonotonic can be interpreted in terms of 
“good” or “bad” news (depending if future payoffs are greater or lower than past ones). More 
importantly, comonotonicity has a financial meaning: when two payoffs are comonotonic they 
can’t hedge each other. This property is central to the Ghirardato-Fubini theorem that yields 
two hierarchies between preferences on uncertain payoffs and preferences on date contingent 
payoffs.  In  practice,  comonotonicity  is  too  strong  a  condition  to  satisfy  and  must  be 
understood as a reference for applications to valuation problems where whether the timing or 
the uncertainty is the most relevant feature. We considered investments where time variations 
can’t be hedged so that we can apply the criterion DE (discounted expectation) over future 
payoffs in section 3 and situations where uncertain variations can’t be hedged so that we can 
use the criterion ED (expected discounting) in section 4. In both cases, the criterion is a 
double integral with the first one linear. As can be seen in the examples we referred to, there 
are cash flows where uncertainty is the primary concern of the DM, others where it’s time that 
is more relevant. In a situation where the timing of decisions is crucial (for instance for a 
public project such as: when shall we launch a preventive campaign against an epidemics?) 
the DM may want to concentrate on the conditional discount factors. As we have seen in 
section 4, the payoffs before information arrives do influence the conditional discount factors: 
for instance a lot of cash before information strikes may lower the discount factors used for 
later dates. 
Conversely, in many investment problems, it’s the uncertain variations of payoffs that are the 
main concern, for instance because the DM refers to market (additive) discount factors. Then, 
the DM needs to know the conditional measure on uncertain states in order to include option   28 
values  in  the  present  value.  As  we  have  seen,  this  measure  depends  on  the  type  of 
information: if it’s good news (information goes in the same way than future payoffs), Bayes 
rule is used; If it’s bad news, it’s the contrary of information that is taken into account in the 
updating rule (Dempster-Shafer). In a different model (Chateauneuf et al. 2001) it was shown 
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